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Summary
Serious efforts to forge a budget agreement in 2013 will 
increase the likelihood that lawmakers will seek changes to 
tax provisions in order to raise revenue. The exclusion of 
employer-sponsored health insurance premiums and medical 
benefits from taxable income could be a target, since this 
exclusion reduced federal tax revenues by $268 billion in 2011 
alone—by far the largest federal tax expenditure. Moreover, 
the exclusion disproportionately subsidizes those with 
higher incomes. Yet proposals to change the tax exclusion of 
employer-sponsored insurance have provoked intense debate. 
In this brief, we provide estimates of the revenue potential 
and distributional consequences of a new policy option. The 
policy we analyze here would impose a cap, or dollar limit, 
on the aggregate cost of employer-sponsored health coverage 
excluded from income and payroll taxes. The cap would be 
set at the 75th percentile of the sum of premiums and other 
medical benefits, and would be indexed, or allowed to grow 
over time, by a five-year average of the rate of GDP growth. 
Our goal in choosing the level and indexing for the cap was 
to select a policy that would make a significant contribution 
to debt reduction, but would be distributionally equitable. We 
answer four critical questions related to the 75th percentile cap 
on the exclusion of premium and medical benefits: What are 
the estimated new tax revenues related to this policy in 2014 
and 2014–2023? How many people would pay higher taxes in 
each quintile of income? How much would taxes increase for 
those paying higher taxes? And, what are the characteristics of 
employers whose employees are likely to pay higher taxes?
We show that the 75th percentile tax cap would produce $264.0 
billion in new income and payroll tax revenues over the coming 
decade while still preserving 93 percent of the tax subsidies 
available under the current policy. Across all tax units, 15.7 percent 
would pay higher taxes under the 75th percentile cap on the 
exclusion of premium and medical benefits in 2014, with this share 
increasing to 20.0 percent by 2023. Although tax units across the 
entire income distribution would experience some tax increases, 
these increases are considerably smaller and less prevalent at 
lower income levels. The policy change would affect public-sector 
employees to a greater extent than private-sector employees. In 
addition, among private-sector employees, those in the financial 
services/real estate or professional services industries would be 
affected to a greater extent, while employees in other industries 
such as the retail industry, would be affected to a lesser extent. 
Establishments with a union presence have only a modestly higher 
share of employees with premiums above the 75th percentile 
premium, compared to the average across all establishments.
Serious efforts to forge a budget agreement in 2013 will increase 
the likelihood that lawmakers will seek changes to tax provisions in 
order to raise revenue. The exclusion of employer-sponsored health 
insurance premiums and medical benefits from taxation could be a 
target. This exclusion reduced federal tax revenues by $268 billion 
in 2011 alone—by far the largest federal tax expenditure. Because it 
reduces taxable income, the exclusion benefits taxpayers in higher 
tax brackets more than those facing lower tax rates.1 And, since 
higher-income individuals are much more likely than lower-income 
individuals to have employer-sponsored insurance, higher-income 
individuals are much more likely to receive this tax subsidy.2 
Moreover, due to the continuing shift in compensation from 
wages and salaries to medical benefits, even if total compensation 
grows at the same rate as GDP, over time both income and payroll 
taxes would decrease substantially as a share of GDP.3 This could 
have serious adverse consequences for programs funded primarily 
by payroll taxes, particularly Social Security and Part A of the 
Medicare program.4 Yet proposals to limit the tax exclusion of 
employer-sponsored insurance have provoked intense debate. 
Affordable Care Act’s Excise Tax on the Highest 
Employer-Sponsored Insurance Premiums and Benefits
A modest limitation of the tax exclusion of employer insurance is 
included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA).5 Beginning in 2018, 
the ACA imposes a 40 percent excise tax on employer-sponsored 
plans that exceed a threshold aggregate cost. This provision taxes 
the amount that the plan’s aggregate cost exceeds the threshold 
defined under the ACA. Aggregate cost is defined broadly to 
include employer-paid premiums, tax-free employee premium 
contributions, reimbursements under a flexible spending account 
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for medical expenses, health reimbursement arrangements (HRA), 
employer contributions to a health savings account (HSA), and 
supplementary health insurance coverage, excluding dental and 
vision coverage. In 2018, the threshold aggregate cost is tentatively 
set at $10,200 for a policy covering one person and $27,500 
for a policy covering more than one person. The threshold will 
receive a one-time upward adjustment to the degree that the costs 
of the Federal Employees’ Health Benefit Plan Blue Cross/Blue 
Shield standard premiums rise more than 55 percent between 
2010 and 2018. Starting in 2020, the thresholds will increase by 
the consumer price index for urban consumers (the CPI-U). The 
thresholds will be adjusted for variation in plan costs caused by 
the age and sex of enrollees. In addition, increased thresholds will 
be set for retirees and employees covered under employer plans in 
certain high-risk industries (e.g., police officers, firefighters).6 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Joint Committee 
on Taxation (JCT) estimate that the ACA’s provision will increase 
government revenue by $11 billion in fiscal year 2018 and $111 
billion during the five fiscal years (2018 to 2022) when the excise 
tax is in effect.7 The JCT estimates that less than 20 percent of the 
revenue produced by such a provision would come from direct 
imposition of the excise tax on those with high-cost plans.8 The 
vast majority of revenues result from a shift in compensation 
away from medical benefits to taxable wages, as employers offer 
lower-premium plans to avoid paying the new excise tax. While 
the ACA’s high-cost excise tax raises significant revenue, additional 
policies addressing the tax exclusion of these medical benefits 
could provide additional revenue and make the current tax 
exclusion less regressive overall. 
Recent Proposals for Limiting the Tax Exclusion for 
Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance 
Changes to the tax exclusion of employer-sponsored health 
insurance have repeatedly been recommended as part of a broad-
based federal debt-reduction package. Proposals to change the 
tax exclusions of employer-sponsored insurance have included 
capping and phasing out the tax exclusion, eliminating the 
tax exclusion and creating a tax credit, and eliminating the 
tax exclusion and creating a standard tax deduction for health 
insurance. Recent proposals in the first category have included the 
President’s September 2011 Plan for Economic Growth and Deficit 
Reduction,9 the December 2010 National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform chaired by Erskine Bowles and Alan 
Simpson,10 and the November 2010 Debt Reduction Task Force 
chaired by Alice Rivlin and Peter Domenici.11 
New Estimates in this Brief
In this brief, we update our 2009 analysis on this topic12 and 
provide estimates of the revenue potential and distributional 
consequences of a new policy option. This option would impose 
a cap, or dollar limit, on the aggregate cost of employer-sponsored 
health coverage excluded from income and payroll taxes.13 Building 
on options explored in our previous brief, the new policy modeled 
in this brief would apply income and payroll taxes to the premiums 
and medical benefits in excess of a cap set at the 75th percentile 
of premiums. The cap would be indexed, or allowed to grow over 
time, by a five-year average of the rate of GDP growth, where the 
five-year average is used for increased stability.14 In choosing the 
level and indexing for the cap, our goal was to choose a policy 
that would make a significant contribution to debt reduction 
and would be distributionally equitable. For simplicity in this 
brief, we refer to the policy estimated as a 75th percentile cap 
on the exclusion of premium and medical benefits, or a 75th 
percentile tax cap. To investigate the characteristics of employees 
who would be affected by a 75th percentile tax cap, we compare 
the distributions of premiums for private-sector employees with 
those for state and local government employees. In addition, we 
examine implications for private-sector employees by industry 
and union presence. This brief answers four critical questions 
related to the 75th percentile cap on the exclusion of premium 
and medical benefits: What are the estimated revenues related to 
this policy in 2014 and 2014–2023? How many would pay higher 
taxes in each quintile of income? How much would taxes increase 
for those paying higher taxes? And, what are the characteristics 
of employers whose employees are likely to pay higher taxes?
Data and Methods
Estimates from the Tax Policy Microsimulation Model
The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center’s large-scale 
microsimulation model produces revenue and distribution 
estimates of the U.S. federal tax system. The model is similar 
to those used by the CBO, the JCT, and the Treasury’s Office 
of Tax Analysis (OTA). In these estimates, a tax unit is defined 
as an individual or a married couple who file a tax return 
jointly, along with all dependents of that individual or married 
couple. The baseline estimates represent changes in tax policies 
embodied in current law over the time period 2014 to 2023. 
Estimates of tax liability for each tax unit form the basis for 
estimated changes in government tax revenue resulting from 
implementation of the 75th percentile cap on the exclusion 
of premium and medical benefits.15 The modeling of the 75th 
percentile tax cap does not include simulation of changes such 
as changes in benefits offered by employers in response (e.g., a 
shift in compensation from previously untaxed medical benefits 
to taxable wages). However, this simplification is likely to have 
a negligible effect on results. Since the 75th percentile tax cap 
affects both income and payroll taxes, the change in tax burden 
does not depend on whether the policy results in newly taxable 
medical benefits or a shift in compensation from previously 
untaxed medical benefits to taxable wages and salaries. See 
technical appendix and previously published documentation 
for more details regarding the tax model and assumptions.16
Premium Distribution Estimates
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ’s) 2011 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey—Insurance Component (MEPS-
IC) is the source of estimates for (1) the number of employees 
enrolled in health insurance and levels of total health insurance 
premiums at or above the 75th percentile for employees enrolled in 
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private-sector establishments, by firm size, and, in state and local 
governments, by number of employees in 2011; and (2) the number 
of employees at private-sector establishments enrolled in health 
insurance. To estimate the distribution of private-sector premiums 
by employer characteristics, we used a methodology combining 
information in the published summaries from the 2011 MEPS-IC 
and the premium distributions observed in the 2011 Kaiser/HRET 
Employer Survey microdata. See technical appendix for further 
detail on this methodology. 
Results
Tax Revenues Collected in the First Year (2014) and  
over 10 Years (2014–2023) 
Currently, the exclusion of employer-sponsored health insurance 
premiums and medical benefits generates tax expenditures 
estimated to be $271.5 billion in 2014 and $3.6 trillion over 
the 10-year period from 2014 to 2023 (see Exhibit 1).17 Income 
taxes account for nearly two-thirds of the total—$163.9 billion in 
2014 and $2.2 trillion over 10 years. Limiting the amount of the 
premiums and medical benefits18 excludable from income and 
payroll taxes would affect far fewer taxpayers and generate far less 
revenue than completely removing the exclusion. 
In the first year, the policy to limit the exclusion of premiums and 
medical benefits as described above would generate tax revenues 
estimated to be $15.6 billion in 2014 and $264.0 billion over 10 
years, with income taxes consistently accounting for just under 
two-thirds of total tax revenues. Thus, the 75th percentile cap on 
income and payroll taxes, indexed by GDP, would leave 94 percent 
of the current tax subsidies in place in 2014, falling to 92 percent 
in 2023. In aggregate, over the 10-year period 2014–2023, the 75th 
percentile cap policy would leave 93 percent of the full value of the 
tax exclusion in place (Exhibit 2). 
Baseline and Proposala
First Year Last Year Total over 10 Years
2014 2023 2014–2023
Total Baseline Value of the Exclusion of Employer-Sponsored Insurance Premiums and  
Medical Benefitsfor Income and Payroll Taxb
271.5 474.7 3,646.8
       Federal Income Tax 163.9 292.1 2,237.7
       Payroll Tax 107.6 182.6 1,409.2
Total Value of Limiting Exclusion of Employer-Sponsored Insurance Premiums and Medical 
Benefits at 75th Percentile of 2013 Distributions for Income and Payroll Tax Purposes,  
Indexing Limits by 5-Year Average of Growth Rate of GDPb, c
15.6 38.4 264.0
       Federal Income Tax Changes 9.5 23.5 161.9
       Payroll Tax Changes 6.2 14.9 102.1
Exhibit 1:  Income and Payroll Tax Revenue Estimates for Repealing Employer-Sponsored 
Insurance Premium and Medical Benefit Exclusion and Limiting the Exclusion  
at the 75th Percentile Cap for Income and Payroll Tax Purposes for Calendar 
Years 2014–2023 ($ billions)
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0412-8).
a  Baseline is current law. See text for further detail.
b  Employer-sponsored insurance premiums and medical benefit exclusion includes the combined exclusion of both employer contributions and employee contributions via section 125 plans  
(i.e., “cafeteria plans”) for employer-sponsored health insurance premiums, dental and vision insurance premiums, and health saving account and medical flexible spending arrangement  
contributions. Modeled without behavioral change; see text for further detail.
c  Exclusion limits vary by policy type—employee, employee-plus-one, or family. The 75th percentile value is based on the distributions of total employer-sponsored insurance premiums, dental and 
vision premiums, plus health saving account and medical flexible spending arrangement contributions (as opposed to the distribution of exclusion) among individuals with some exclusion with the 
relevant policy type in 2013. The 75th percentile of ESI and medical benefits for employee, employee-plus-one, and family policy distributions in 2013 is $6,600, $12,700, and $18,150, respectively. 
The applicable exclusion limits are the 75th percentile values indexed by the compounded year-to-year growth rate defined as the five-year average of GDP growth rate, and rounded to the nearest 
$50. For example, the limit for family policy in 2016 is $19,950, which is the 75th percentile value of the ESI and medical benefit distribution in 2013 ($18,150) indexed by the five-year average GDP 
growth rate between 2009 and 2013 (2.33%), the five-year average GDP growth rate between 2010 and 2014 (3.42%) and the five-year average GDP growth rate between 2011 and 2015 (3.99%) 
($18,150 x 1.0233 x 1.0342 x 1.0399 = $19,975) and rounded to the nearest $50.
Exhibit 2:  The 75th Percentile Tax Cap Policy 
Leaves In Place 93 Percent of 
Tax Subsidies from the Current 
Exclusion over 10 Years, 2014-2023
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0412-8).
Total Baseline Value of Exclusion of 
Employer-Sponsored Insurance of 
Premiums and Medical Benefits for 
Income and Payroll Tax Purposes
Total Value of Limiting Exclusion at 
75th Percentile of Employer-Sponsored 
Insurance Premiums and Medical Benefits 




Billion in  
Tax Revenue
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The Distribution of Tax Increases by Income in  
2014 and 2023 
Distribution of tax increases and the size of the tax increases are 
driven primarily by those with higher incomes, who are much 
more likely to have employer-sponsored coverage and have higher 
effective marginal tax rates compared to those with lower incomes. 
Among employees with employer-sponsored coverage, those with 
higher incomes are also likely to have more expensive coverage 
compared to those with lower incomes, which would also tend to 
result in higher tax increases under the 75th percentile tax cap for 
those with higher incomes.
How Many Would Pay Higher Taxes? 
Across all tax units in 2014, 15.7 percent would pay higher taxes 
under the 75th percentile cap on the exclusion of premium 
and medical benefits (Exhibit 3). Across income quintiles, this 
increases from 3.3 percent for those in the lowest quintile, 
10.7 percent in the second quintile, 17.5 percent in the middle 
quintile, 25.1 percent in the fourth quintile, and 32.6 percent 
in the highest quintile of income.19 In 2023, as a result of the 
caps being indexed at a slower rate than premium and medical 
benefit growth rates, 20.0 percent of all tax units would pay higher 
taxes, increasing across quintiles of income from 5.7 percent for 
those in the lowest quintile, 13.4 percent in the second quintile, 
21.5 percent in the middle quintile, 31.2 percent in the fourth 
quintile, and 39.5 percent in the highest quintile of income. 
How Much Would Taxes Increase for those  
Paying Higher Taxes? 
Among tax units with a tax increase, the average estimated change 
in 2014 taxes would be $633, with the amount increasing with 
quintiles of income, from an average of $284 for those in the 
lowest quintile, $503 in the second quintile, $544 in the middle 
quintile, $619 in the fourth quintile, and $840 in the highest 
quintile of income (Exhibit 3). After 10 years of real growth in 
wages, premiums, and medical benefits, the estimated average 
change in 2023 taxes increases across quintiles of income, from 
$636 for those in the lowest quintile, $873 in the second quintile, 
$914 in the middle quintile, $1,147 in the fourth quintile, and 
$1,544 in the highest quintile of income. 
How Does the Choice of Indexing of the Cap Affect 
Revenues Over Time?
In the 75th percentile tax cap policy we analyze here, we 
chose GDP as the index for the cap. Regardless of the choice 
of initial level of the cap, an alternative index that is less 
restrictive, such as indexing by the growth in premiums and 
medical benefits, would lead to slower growth in tax revenues 
over time. An alternative index that is more restrictive, such 
as CPI, would lead to more rapid growth in tax revenues over 
time. The GDP indexing that we chose is in the middle.20
The initial level of the cap and the indexing of the cap 
interact in their effects on the amount of revenue raised over 
time. Previous research demonstrated that if the index grows 
more slowly than premiums, the difference in revenue raised 
over time between a median and a 75th percentile cap is 
diminished. However, if the index chosen is less restrictive, 
the choice of the initial level of the cap has a larger effect on 
revenues over time. For example, indexing at the same rate 
at which premiums are assumed to grow, an initial cap at the 
75th percentile of premiums would decrease income and 
payroll tax revenue by about 54 percent relative to revenues 




Tax Units with Tax Increasesd
2023
Tax Units with Tax Increasesd
Percentage of Tax Units with a  
Tax Increase in 2014
Average Change in Federal Income 
Tax Among Tax Units with a  
Tax Increase in 2014
Percentage of Tax Units with a  
Tax Increase in 2023
Average Change in Federal Income 
Tax Among Tax Units with a  
Tax Increase in 2023
All 15.7 $633 20.0 $1,133 
Lowest Quintile 3.3 $284 5.7 $636 
Second Quintile 10.7 $503 13.4 $873 
Middle Quintile 17.5 $544 21.5 $914 
Fourth Quintile 25.1 $619 31.2 $1,147 
Top Quintile 32.6 $840 39.5 $1,544 
Exhibit 3:  Distribution of Federal Tax Change by Income Percentile In 2014 and 2023, 
Limiting the Exclusion of Employer-Sponsored Insurance Premiums and Medical 
Benefits at 75th Percentile of 2013 Distributions for Income and Payroll Tax 
Purposes, indexing limits by 5-year average of growth rate of GDP
Source: Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (version 0412-8ED). 29/1/2013
a  Calendar year. Baseline is current law. See notes to exhibit 1 for more detail on the policy modeled. 
b  Includes both filing and nonfiling units but excludes those that are dependents of other tax units. Income is defined as “cash income”; for detail,  
see http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/TaxModel/income.cfm. Tax units with negative cash income are excluded from the lowest income class but are included in the totals.
c  The income percentile classes used in this table are based on the income distribution for the entire population and contain an equal number of people, not tax units.  
The breaks are (in 2012 dollars): 20%, $27,797; 40%, $48,516; 60%, $76,595; 80%, $113,780; 90%, $181,697; 99%, $657,697.
d  Includes tax units with a change in federal tax burden of $10 or more in absolute value.
Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy Issues   5
While the current income tax exclusion disproportionately 
subsidizes those with higher incomes, the dollar amount of the tax 
exclusion represents a larger share of after-tax income (defined as 
cash income minus individual income tax net of refundable credits, 
corporate income tax, Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes, 
and estate tax) for those with lower incomes.22 Accordingly, for 
those paying higher taxes, the proposed policy decreases after-tax 
income by a greater percentage than for those with lower incomes. 
However, even for the 3.3 percent in the lowest quintile of income 
who pay higher taxes in 2014, the reduction in after-tax income 
is less than 3 percent. For the 5.7 percent in the lowest quintile of 
income who pay higher taxes in 2023, the reduction in after-tax 
income is less than 5 percent (data not shown).23
The 75th Percentile Premium is Higher for Employees  
in State and Local Government Coverage Compared  
to Private-Sector Coverage
To shed more light on the types of employees that would be 
affected by this policy change, we draw inferences from the 2011 
MEPS-IC data.24 Exhibit 4 compares employment and premiums 
for private-sector employees (by firm size) to those for public-
sector state and local government employees (data are not available 
for public-sector federal government employees). In particular, 
we examine the distributions of premiums among these groups 
of employees to determine whether state and local government 
employees had premiums above the 75th percentile premiums 
of private-sector employment. In 2011, driven by the relatively 
large size of the private sector, the number of employees enrolled 
in health insurance coverage offered by their employer was much 
greater among private-sector employees (about 55 million) than 
among state government employees (4 million) or local government 
employees (9 million). 
Premium distributions differed between the private and public 
sector. The 75th percentile premium for employee-only coverage 
in particular was considerably higher—more than 10 percent 
higher—in the public sector than the private sector. In addition, 
the 75th percentile premium for employee-plus-one and family 
Employees Enrolled in their 
Employer’s Offer of Insurance  
in 2011 (In Millions)A
75th Percentile Premium (in $2011)B
Employee-Only Coverage Employee-Plus-One Coverage Family Coverage
All Private-Sector Establishments 54.8 $6,100 $12,000 $18,000 
       Fewer than 50 Employees 9.5 $6,200 * $13,000 * $17,000 
       50 or More Employees 45.3 $6,100 $12,000 $18,000 
State Government 3.6 $6,828 *^ $12,540 * $16,944 
Local Government by Total Number of Employees 9.2  NA  NA  NA
       Fewer than 250 Employees 1.4 $7,044 *^ $14,645 *^ $18,924 *
       250–999 Employees 23.0 $7,260 *^ $14,328 *^ $18,768 *
       1,000–4,999 Employees 2.6 $7,212 *^ $13,284 *^ $18,768 *
       5,000–9,999 Employees 1.0 $7,098 *^ $12,900 * $17,700 
       10,000 or More Employees 2.0 $6,780 *^ $12,288 * $17,040 
Exhibit 4:  Number of Employees Enrolled in Health Insurance and Levels of Total Health 
Insurance Premium at the 75th Percentiles for Employees Enrolled in Private 
Sector Establishments by Firm Size and in State and Local Governments by 
Number of Employees, in 2011
Source:  Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Financing, Access and Cost Trends. 2011 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component. Table III.G.1 Premium distributions  
(in dollars) for employees enrolled in single, employee-plus-one, and family coverage at the 75th percentile through State and local government jobs by government type:  
United States, 2011
NA = not available in the published data
a  Number of all employees that are enrolled in health insurance through state and local government jobs that offer health insurance, by government type and size and census division, United States, 
2011, based on MEPS-IC Table III.B.1, Table III.B.2, and Table III.B.2.b.
b  Total premium includes employer and employee contributions.
*  Indicates cells that are above the 75th percentile of all private-sector establishment premiums in 2011 by policy type: employee-only, employee-plus-one, or family.
^  Indicates cells that are more than 10% higher than the 75th percentile of all private-sector establishment premiums in 2011 by policy type.
How Does the Choice of Indexing of the Cap Affect the 
Distribution of Tax Increases Over Time? 
In previous analysis of similar policies to limit the tax 
exclusion of premiums and medical benefits, we found that 
a similar share of tax units faced increased taxes regardless of 
the index chosen for the cap—provided that the index was 
more restrictive than the rate of premium growth. However, 
the choice of indexing has a large effect on the average tax 
increase for those facing a tax increase. For example, for a 
policy similar to the one proposed in this brief, switching 
indexing of the cap from GDP to CPI would roughly double 
the average tax increases over a 10-year period for those facing 
a tax increase for all quintiles of income.25
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coverage exceeded that of the private-sector for moderate-sized 
(e.g., under 5,000 employees) local governments. For example, 
the 75th percentile premium for employee-plus-one coverage 
across all establishments in the private sector was $12,000, while 
the 75th percentile premium for employee-plus-one coverage in 
local governments with fewer than 250 employees was $14,645. 
Thus, setting a cap on the tax exclusion of premium and medical 
benefits at the 75th percentile of private-sector premiums, would 
affect public-sector employees to a greater extent—the 75th 
percentile premiums for some types of state and local government 
coverage were higher than the 75th percentile premiums for 
private-sector coverage.
Financial and Professional Service Industries—and 
to a Lesser Extent, Unions—Have a Higher Share of 
Employees with Premiums above the Average  
75th Percentile Premium
To further investigate the characteristics of private-sector employees 
who might be affected by a policy of capping the tax exclusion at 
the 75th percentile of private-sector premiums, we draw inferences 
from analysis of a combination of the 2011 MEPS-IC and the  
2011 Kaiser/HRET Employer Survey, as described above. In 
particular, we examine private-sector employees by industry and 
union presence.26 For these groups in 2011, Exhibit 5 shows the 
estimated share with premiums at or above the 75th percentile 
premiums of private-sector establishments. 
Across industries, employees in the combined financial services/
real estate industries (over 5 million enrolled employees, or 12 
percent of employees enrolled in health insurance through their 
employer) and the professional services industry (17 million 
enrolled employees, or 31 percent of employees enrolled in health 
insurance through their employer) had a higher share of employees 
with premiums above the 75th percentile premium.27 In financial 
services/real estate, the share with this level of premiums was 29 
percent for employee-only coverage, 28 percent for employee-
plus-one coverage, and 32 percent for family coverage. The share 
was even greater for professional services at 35 percent for both 
employee-only coverage and family coverage, and 34 percent for 
employee-plus-one coverage. Industries whose employees would 
be least affected by a 75th percentile tax cap include the retail and 
construction industries. 
Of the nearly 55 million employees enrolled in health insurance 
through their employer, about 10 million (18 percent) are 
employed at establishments with a union presence (enrollment 
data not shown). For employee-only coverage, 31 percent of 
employees in establishments with a union presence had premiums 
above the 75th percentile premium. For other types of coverage, 
establishments with a union presence had only a modestly higher 
share of employees with premiums above the 75th percentile 
premium—26 percent for employee-plus-one coverage and 27 
percent for family coverage.
Percentage of Cell at or above the 75th Percentile Private-Sector Premium by Family Configurationa
Employee-Only Coverage Employee-Plus-One Coverage Family Coverage
Share of Private-Sector Employees Enrolled in Health Insurance with Premiums  
at or above the 75th Percentile by Family Configuration 25.0% 25.0% 25.0%
By Industry Groupb
       Agriculture/Fishing/Forestry — — —
       Mining/Manufacturing 17.6% 16.3% 16.2%
       Construction 22.7% 20.2% 18.0%
       Utilities/Transportation 19.2% 21.7% 20.4%
       Wholesale 22.0% 23.1% 21.4%
       Retail 17.1% 20.1% 14.4%
       Financial Services/Real Estate 28.9%* 27.8%* 31.7%*
       Professional Services 35.4%* 33.9%* 34.8%*
       Other Services 19.8% 20.9% 22.9%
Union Presenceb, c
       Some Union Employees 31.0%* 25.7%* 27.2%*
Exhibit 5:  Estimated Share of Employees with Premiums at or Above the 75th Percentile 
Premiums of Private-Sector Establishments, by Employer Characteristics  
and Family Configuration in 2011
Source: Urban Institute calculation of estimates based on MEPS-IC 2011 and the Kaiser/HRET 2011 Employer Survey.
a  Estimated share of employees enrolled at this level of premium or higher among employees enrolled in their employer’s offer of insurance; premium distributions based on employees by premium by 
family configuration in all private establishments in 2011. Premium includes both employer and employee contributions.
b  Premium distributions by union presence and industry group distributions are informed by published mean and standard errors by those characteristics, and the overall published distributions of 
private-sector premiums by family configuration. Some industry groupings differed in the MEPS-IC and Kaiser/HRET data, and computation of estimates required additional assumptions; see technical 
appendix for more detail.
c  An employee is categorized as being in an establishment with “union presence” if any of the establishment’s employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
*  indicates cells that are above the 75th percentile of all private-sector establishment premiums in 2011 by family configuration.
— Indicates data were suppressed due to variability of the small sample estimate.
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Conclusions
This brief shows that limiting the tax exclusion for employer-
sponsored health insurance beyond the provisions already enacted 
in the ACA could be a significant source of revenue for the federal 
government. A cap on the income and payroll tax exclusion set 
at the 75th percentile of private-sector premiums and indexed by 
GDP growth would produce $264.0 billion in new income and 
payroll tax revenues over the coming decade while still preserving 
93 percent of the tax subsidies available under the current policy. 
Across all tax units, 15.7 percent would pay higher taxes under 
the 75th percentile cap on the exclusion of premium and medical 
benefits in 2014, with this share increasing to 20.0 percent by 2023. 
Although tax units across the entire income distribution would 
experience some tax increases, these increases are considerably 
smaller and less prevalent at lower-income levels.
Setting the cap at the 75th percentile of premiums would affect 
public-sector employees to a greater extent, since the 75th 
percentile premiums for some types of state and local government 
coverage were higher than the 75th percentile premiums for 
private-sector coverage. In addition, a closer examination of the 
characteristics of private-sector employees showed that employees 
in the financial services/real estate or professional services 
industries would be affected to a greater extent, while employees  
in other industries such as the retail industry would be affected  
to a lesser extent. Establishments with a union presence have 
only a modestly higher share of employees with premiums above 
the 75th percentile premium, but the differences are larger for 
employee-only coverage.
Many employees in groups with higher premiums have traded 
off wages for more costly medical benefits. As a result, over time, 
employee compensation has shifted substantially from wages and 
salaries to medical benefits, and the trend is expected to continue.28 
A policy such as the 75th percentile cap on the income and payroll 
tax exclusion would cause some employers to shift compensation 
back to wages and salaries rather than medical benefits. Lower 
premium benefit designs could entail a combination of higher 
levels of cost-sharing, tighter utilization management, more limited 
network offerings, extensively tiered networks (with different cost-
sharing levels even for in-network providers)—and, possibly, lower 
negotiated provider rates. We cannot predict the precise change 
in the nature of medical benefits offered. We believe the impact 
would be modest, since the policy leaves the vast majority of the 
current tax exclusion in place. As a result, the 75th percentile tax 
cap is not likely to result in a dramatic change in medical benefits, 
nor a dramatic reduction in the growth of health spending. The 
main impact of the policy, in addition to the tax revenues, would 
be to make the current tax exclusion less regressive overall.
To further the goal of making the current tax exclusion less 
regressive, several policy design options could further concentrate 
the tax increases on higher-income employees. A policy option 
modeled by Jonathan Gruber in 2009 would apply a “progressive 
cap” to the tax exclusion. This policy would retain both the 
income and the payroll tax exclusions for lower-income employees, 
cap the income tax exclusion at a specified premium level for 
middle- and higher-income employees, and completely eliminate 
the income tax exclusion for those with the highest incomes.29 
More recently, a similar policy retaining the payroll tax exclusion 
was modeled.30 Neither policy would protect lower-income 
employees from the regressivity of payroll taxes if employers 
respond to the limitation of the current exclusion by shifting 
compensation from medical benefits to wages. However, since 
relatively few low-income employees have employer-sponsored 
insurance (and even fewer have high-premium insurance), and 
employer coverage for these employees is decreasing over time,31 
we would expect a modest impact on lower-income employees 
regardless of policy design.
Our analysis of a new policy imposing a 75th percentile cap on 
the income and payroll tax exclusion shows that limiting the tax 
exclusion for employer-sponsored insurance could be an important 
component of a broad-based federal debt-reduction package, while 
having minimal impacts on those with lower incomes. In addition, 
although not analyzed explicitly in this brief, the 75th percentile 
tax cap policy would also result in increased state tax revenues, 
since state income tax rules generally reflect federal income tax 
rules with respect to exclusions.32 Effects on health care cost growth 
of a 75th percentile tax cap policy are likely to be modest, because 
the vast majority of the current tax exclusion would remain in place 
and because the existing excise tax on the highest-cost policies in 
the ACA is already current law. However, further limiting the tax 
exclusion would not only provide additional tax revenue to the 
federal government, but would also mitigate the regressivity of the 
current treatment of employer contributions to premiums.
Technical Appendix
Estimates from the Tax Policy Microsimulation Model
The tax revenue and distribution estimates in this paper come from 
the Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model.33 
The model calculates tax liability for a nationally representative 
sample of tax units, both under the rules that currently exist 
(current law) and under alternative policy options. A tax unit 
is an individual or a married couple who files an income tax 
return—or would file if their income were high enough—plus any 
dependents.34 Calculations of tax liability for each tax unit form 
the basis for estimated changes in government tax revenue resulting 
from implementation of each policy alternative.35 The primary 
data source for the tax model is the 2004 Public Use File (PUF) 
produced by the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal 
Revenue Service. Data from the March 2005 Current Population 
Survey (CPS) were used to add information not available in PUF.36 
In addition, data from various surveys were used to add detailed 
information related to consumption, education, health, retirement, 
and estate tax calculations. In particular, data from the 2005 
MEPS-IC; data from the 2007 and 2008 Kaiser/HRET Employer 
Health Benefits Surveys; and CBO, JCT, and Department of 
Treasury estimates and projections were used to impute information 
regarding employer-provided health insurance and medical benefits.
The estimates presented in this brief project changes in tax liability 
relative to the current law (i.e., tax policies currently scheduled 
to take effect in each year between 2014 and 2023). Thus, tax 
provisions legislated under the ACA, including the excise tax on 
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high-cost employer health insurance premiums, are part of the 
current law baseline. For purposes of modeling the 75th percentile 
tax cap, tax units are assumed to keep unchanged their decisions 
to work, to earn, or how they choose to enroll in health insurance 
in response to a change in policy, and employers would not change 
employment decisions or benefits provided. While modeling 
the 75th percentile tax cap without these “behavioral” responses 
was implemented for simplicity and clarity, it is likely that this 
simplification has a negligible effect on results. In particular, 
assuming that employees’ compensation is unchanged, an identical 
amount of income and payroll tax revenues result whether the 
75th percentile tax cap results in employees switching to a plan 
with a lower premium and medical benefits or results in employees 
retaining the same plan they have under the current law. That 
is, the change in tax burden does not depend on whether or not 
the policy results in newly taxable medical benefits or a shift in 
compensation from previously untaxed medical benefits to taxable 
wages and salaries.
In addition, as mentioned in the text, the revenues in Exhibit 1 do 
not include the revenues associated with the current law high-cost 
excise tax. If the excise tax were repealed and replaced with the 
75th percentile tax cap presented in this paper, the distributional 
implications would differ to some extent. The impact would 
depend on the net effects of the following factors: (1) taxpayers’ 
effective tax rate on the portion of benefits potentially subject 
to high-cost excise tax compared to the effective tax rate on the 
portion of benefits subject to the proposed cap, (2) the relative 
thresholds of the excise tax versus the cap, and (3) taxpayers’ 
valuations of different types of compensation and benefits. 
Premium Distribution Estimates
For the analysis presented in Exhibit 5, distributional summaries 
of private-sector premiums by coverage type and employer 
characteristics and premium distributions by decile by coverage 
type from the 2011 MEPS-IC data were combined with premium 
distributions by employer characteristics from the 2011 Kaiser/
HRET Survey of Employer Health Benefits. The methodological 
approach was as follows.
In the Kaiser/HRET data, each firm’s reported premiums were 
replicated according to the number of covered employees 
represented by each sampled firm. Using a statistical fitting 
procedure in SAS, we determined that the Kaiser/HRET premium 
data closely fit a gamma distribution (i.e., predicted quintiles 
generally fall in 95 percent confidence intervals estimated from 
actual distribution), particularly when the most extreme premium 
values (those more than 3.5 standard deviations from the 
mean) were removed. The means and variances of these gamma 
distributions of premium by employment characteristic were 
then benchmarked to the means and variances by employment 
characteristic provided in the MEPS-IC survey, which draws on a 
much larger sample compared to the Kaiser/HRET survey. Due to 
the small sample size, we were unable to compute variances for the 
agricultural, fish, and forestry industry grouping. 
In a few cases, employer industry categories in the Kaiser/HRET 
data did not match those in the MEPS-IC data, necessitating 
additional assumptions regarding variance. Specifically, the Kaiser/
HRET survey publishes separate means for “professional service” 
and “other service” firms, but separate variances are not available. 
To infer these distributional variances, we combined the standard 
error of the industry’s mean reported by MEPS-IC with an estimate 
of the MEPS-IC’s relative design effect by the estimated number of 
employees. MEPS-IC data include a significant share of employees 
with unknown union presence at their establishment; due to this 
lack of data, none of these employees are included in the estimates 
of employees with union presence.
In addition, the 2011 Kaiser/HRET data do not include premiums 
for employee-plus-one coverage. In the MEPS-IC, the difference 
between the standard deviations for employee-plus-one coverage 
and employee coverage is approximately 64 percent of the 
difference between the standard deviations for family coverage 
and employee coverage. We used this estimate to make variance 
estimates for employee-plus-one coverage according to employer 
characteristics. Due to the necessity of employing additional 
assumptions to generate employee-plus-one premium distributions, 
these estimates are likely to be less reliable.
To compute the national thresholds used in Exhibit 5, we used 
a modeled distribution rather than reported values to determine 
the 75th percentile premium threshold levels, because the values 
reported in the MEPS-IC are substantially altered by rounding 
to the nearest 100 dollars of premiums. Using the computed 
thresholds, we calculated the number of employees by employment 
characteristic and coverage type whose premiums were expected to 
exceed the threshold.
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